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Abstract
I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization
critically depends on what the analyst knows about the details of the problem a particular decision
maker faces. When the analyst does not know anything about the agent’s payoffs or beliefs and can
only observe the sequence of actions taken by the decision maker any arbitrary sequence of actions
can be implemented as the choice of an agent that solves some intertemporal utility maximization
problem under uncertainty.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to answer the following: are there any testable implications
of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization (SEU)?
SEU is the theory that states that an agent chooses actions consistent with the maxi
mization of the expectation of a utility function that depends on the action of the agent and
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on the condition of the environment, and where the expectation is taken over the condi
tion of the environment with respect to some probabilistic belief function. What is shown
in this paper is that whether SEU has testable implications crucially depends on what is
known by the analyst. In particular, if (i) the analyst does not know the preferences or
the beliefs of the agent and (ii) the analyst can observe the sequence of actions over time
chosen by the agent, then SEU has no testable implications. I show this by providing a
SEU representation of a model of intertemporal behavior where the analyst does not know
the preferences or the beliefs of the agent. The analyst, however, observes the sequence
of actions chosen. In this setup any observed behavior can be viewed as the choice of an
agent that maximizes expected utility for some utility function, discount factor, uncertainty
space and prior belief.
The intuition behind this result is that when choice over time depends on the evolution
of a stock that is not known to us then we have enough degrees of freedom in our repre
sentation of that stock to interpret any observed behavior as the solution to some problem
of intertemporal choice. In the case of SEU, the “stock” is the belief held by the agent. If
nothing is known about it, it can then be described by the analyst as that which justiﬁes
whatever action the agent chose. That such a belief exists and is well-behaved from a prob
abilistic standpoint arises from the fact that the uncertainty space over which it is deﬁned
can also be picked arbitrarily.
The result is not surprising upon reﬂection about what it says, and to many it is an insight
that is known to the research community. Despite this, it is often argued that a departure
from SEU is necessary in applications because the behavior it implies seems inconsistent
with what agents do in the real world. This suggests the need to make the point clearly
by presenting a stark, unambiguous case: one where complete ignorance about preferences
and beliefs on the part of the analyst strips SEU of any predictive content. The result of
this paper is therefore important because it provides a useful albeit extreme benchmark.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, I present an example
of the result. In Section 3, I introduce elements of the theory of statistical decisions. In
Section 4, I present the result. Section 5 addresses robustness issues and Section 6 discusses
the related literature. Section 7 concludes.
2. A simple example
Assume that the agent has two actions: to carry an umbrella around (a 1 ) or to leave
the umbrella home (a 2 ). The environment can take one of two conditions: it can either
be sunny (S) or rainy (R). The analyst observes the sequence {(at , yt )}∞
t=1 of actions and
2
1
conditions of the environment over time, where (at , yt ) ∈ {a , a } × {S, R} := A × Y and
knows nothing about the preferences or the beliefs of the agent. This sequence is the data
to be rationalized. Deﬁne a 1–1 map between A and Y . This map can be arbitrary, but here
I deﬁne one that is adapted to the interpretation suggested by the labels of the elements
of A and Y : associate a 1 to R and a 2 to S. The utility function that rationalizes this data is
based on this map, namely, u(a 1 , R) = u(a 2 , S) = 1 and u(a 1 , S) = u(a 2 , R) = 0. I now
turn to the construction of the belief function, which will depend on the evolution of at
over time and on u. The important thing is that it need not depend at all on the evolution
of yt .

To build this function I adapt an idea used by Oakes (1985). Let v(yt+1 | ht ) be the
probabilistic belief of the agent about the environment in period t + 1 given the history
ht = {(aτ , yτ )}tτ =1 . Deﬁne v(yt+1 = S | ht ) = 3/4 when at+1 = a 2 and v(yt+1 = S | ht ) =
1/4 when at+1 = a 1 . As a discount factor, pick ρ = 0. Notice that, period by period, this
agent is choosing at , the myopic expected utility maximizing choice when the expectation
is taken over yt with respect to the forecast v(yt | ht−1 ). The literature on learning in games
(cf. Jordan, 1997, p. 154; Nyarko, 1997a, Proposition 7.1) shows that any agent who is
best-responding to a prediction rule such as that given by v is, in fact, best responding to
a subjective probability distribution on some large parameter space, which in this case we
take to be equal to {S, R}∞ . Hence the agent is a SEU maximizer (see also the discussion
in Section 5).

3. Statistical decision theory
3.1. Actions, the environment
Consider an agent facing an intertemporal choice problem under uncertainty. At each
date t � 1, the agent chooses an action at ∈ A. After choosing at she observes the condition
of the environment yt ∈ Y . The choice problem is being observed by an analyst who only
sees the sequence {(at , yt )}∞
t=1 . It is therefore important to distinguish what is known by
both the agent and analyst from what is known by the agent alone. The sets A and Y are
the primitives of the problem that are given and known to both the agent and the analyst.
Let A and Y be complete, compact, separable metric spaces with associated σ -ﬁelds A
and Y, respectively. Assume that A has at least two elements and that Y has at least the
cardinality of A.
The set of histories of length T , HT , is the T -fold Cartesian product of A × Y . H0
containsthe single abstract element h0 , the null history. The set of all (ﬁnite) histories
is H = T �0 HT . The set of inﬁnite sequences of proﬁles (a, y) is denoted Z. Let the
tth coordinate of z ∈ Z be zt and the ﬁrst t coordinates z(t). Let F denote the σ -ﬁeld of
subsets of H derived from the Borel σ -ﬁelds on each HT . Let h · h� be the concatenation of
two histories h and h� . A t-period history will be denoted by ht . A strategy for the agent is
a F -measurable function σ : H → A that for each history selects an element of A. Let Σ
be the set of strategies of the agent.
The derived elements of the problem that are given and known to both the agent and the
analyst are, therefore, A, Y, HT (T = 0, 1, . . .), H, F, Z and Σ.
3.2. Payoffs, beliefs
Given the agent’s choice and the condition of the environment she receives a reward,
not observed by the analyst, according to a payoff function u : A × Y → �+ . The agent
monitors the condition of the environment according to a collection Θ (of models of
the environment) and a prior probability distribution v deﬁned over Θ. Given one such
model θ and a history h the agent has beliefs over the upcoming y given by the map
(h, θ ) �→ η(· | h, θ ) ∈ Δ(Y ). The interpretation is that the agent considers the condition of

the environment to be a process governed by one of the models in Θ, but is not sure exactly
which (hence the prior probability distribution over Θ). Let u be measurable with respect
to the product A × Y and assume that Θ is a complete, separable metric space.
The primitives of the problem that are given and known only by the agent are, therefore,
u, Θ, v and η.
It will be useful for what follows to derive from η the map (σ, θ ) �→ pμ (· | σ, θ) ∈ Δ(Z),
a probability distribution over the inﬁnite sequences in Z.1 This distribution, derived from
the primitives known only to the agent, is consequently only known by the agent.

4. Arbitrary Bayesian rational behavior
A strategy σ is consistent with a given sequence {(at , yt )}∞
t=1 if σ (h0 ) = a1 and for all
t � 1, σ (a1 , y1 , . . . , at , yt ) = at+1 . A payoff function u : A × Y → �+ is nontrivial if
� u(a �� , y).
there are actions a � , a �� and a condition of the environment y such that u(a � , y) =
The main result can thus be stated as follows:
Theorem 1. For every sequence {(at∗ , yt∗ )}∞
t=1 ∈ Z there are a complete, separable metric
space Θ, a prior v ∈ Δ(Θ), a probability function η, a nontrivial utility function u, a dis
count factor ρ and a strategy σ ∗ consistent with {(at∗ , yt∗ )}∞
t=1 such that
∗

σ ∈ arg sup

σ ∈Σ

� � �
∞

ρ t−1 u(zt )pη (dz | σ, θ)v(dθ ).

Θ Z t=1

Proof. Let f : A → Y be a 1–1 measurable function.2 Deﬁne u(a, y) = 1 if y = f (a) and
u(a, y) = 0 otherwise. �Then, there is a map â �→ μaˆ ∈ Δ(Y ) such that, for every action
â ∈ A, â ∈ arg maxa∈A Y u(a, y)μaˆ (dy).3
Let Θ = Y ∞ ; for every θ = (y1 , y2 , . . .) and ht = (a1 , y1 , . . . , at , yt ) let η(· | ht , θ) =
yt+1 . By Kolmogorov’s extension theorem the prior v on Θ can be chosen so that
∗
for every ﬁnite se
v1 :=margY1 v = μa1∗ and vt+1 = margYt+1 v(· | y1 , . . . , yt ) = μat+1
quence (y1 , . . . , yt ).
Deﬁne σ ∗ as follows: for all t � 0 and all ht belonging to a measurable subset of Ht ,
∗ . Pick any ρ ∈ [0, 1). Then σ ∗ maximizes SEU as required.
∗
σ (ht ) = at+1
1 The derivation of p (· | σ, θ) is as follows: First, deﬁne p recursively for every history h ∈ H. Let p (h |
μ
μ
μ 0
σ, θ) = 1 and pμ (h · (a, y) | σ, θ) = pμ (h | σ, θ) × σ (a | h) × μθ (a | h). Second, deﬁne the cylinders C(h) to be
the set of paths of play z for which z(t) = h, where h belongs to a measurable subset of Ht . Third, deﬁne pμ
over C(h) to be equal to pμ (h | σ, θ). This probability measure is then uniquely extended by continuity from the
cylinders to the σ -ﬁeld on Z generated by the cylinders.
2 The existence of this function follows from the fact that A has cardinality of at least two, Y has cardinality at
least A and these sets are complete, separable metric spaces.
3 Notice that the distribution μ can be chosen so that it has full support on Y . For example, μ = (1 −
aˆ
aˆ
ε)δf (â) + εμ, where μ has full support and ε > 0 is sufﬁciently small.

To see this notice that with the structure at hand the problem can be rewritten as
� �
∞
�
�
sup
ρ t−1 u σ (ht−1 ), θt v(dθ ),
σ ∈Σ

Θ t=1

�
�
t−1
∗
which in turn leads to supσ ∈Σ ∞
t=1 ρ
Y u(σ (ht−1 ), y) vt (dy). To show that σ solves
this problem it sufﬁces (due to the one-shot deviation principle) to check that, given any
partial history hT , there is no expected proﬁtable deviation from σ ∗ (hT ) at date T + 1.
Recall that σ ∗ (hT ) = aT∗ +1 and notice that vt is independent of {aτ }Tτ =1 for t � T + 1.
Hence, the problem at date T + 1 is to choose aT +1 ∈ A to maximize
�
�
∞
�
�
�
T
t−1
ρ
u(aT +1 , y)vT +1 (dy) +
ρ
u σ ∗ (ht−1 , y vt (dy).
(1)
Y

t=T +2

Y

By construction, the ﬁrst term in the summation is maximized by σ ∗ (hT ).

�

5. Robustness issues
It is interesting to ponder whether the result holds as we add assumptions about what
the analyst knows. For example, suppose the analyst knew the shape of the distribution η,
and the parameter space Θ the agent used to represent the uncertainty about the evolution
of yt . Will this invalidate the result? The answer to this question is: not necessarily, as the
examples below demonstrate.
• Consider the case presented in Section 2 and assume that the analyst observes
{(at , yt )}∞
t=1 , and knows the map η, and the parameter space Θ. The analyst may know
the pair (η, Θ), but nothing is gained if Θ just happened to be {S, R}∞ and the agent’s
beliefs about yt a convex combination of Dirac measures. Then, as Section 2 shows,
any behavior can be rationalized as SEU maximization.
• Consider now the case presented in Section 2 but assume this time that the analyst
observes {(at , yt )}∞
t=1 , and that the agent knows that the sequence yt is exchangeable
with respect to the agent’s prior v. Then, by de Finetti’s theorem, with v-probability
one, the empirical distribution of yt converges together with the player’s posterior
over yt+1 to some probability measure (μ∗ , 1 − μ∗ ) over {R, S}. Will this invalidate
the result of this paper?
The answer to this question, again, is: not necessarily. For example, consistent with
the information given above is the representation with Θ = {θ }, μ = (μ∗ , 1 − μ∗ ) and
v = 1θ . This representation, together with the discount factor δ = 0 and the utility
function u(a 1 , R) = 1, u(a 1 , S) = u(a 2 , R) = μ∗ , u(a 2 , R) = 2μ∗ , rationalizes the
given sequence {(at , yt )}∞
t=1 .
• The examples above, when combined, suggest conditions under which the result no
longer holds. Consider once more the setup in Section 2 as in the example above when
the analyst knew that the agent considered the sequence yt to be exchangeable. This
time the analyst also knows that the agent’s representation of the uncertainty over yt

is given by μ over {R, S} with Θ = [0, 1] for some non-singular prior v over Θ.
Exchangeability implies that posterior beliefs are, in the limit, constrained by the
realization of θ , which means that the utility function that rationalizes a particular
sequence {(at , yt )}∞
t=1 , cannot be independent of θ . As a consequence, there is no state
independent utility function that rationalizes {(at , yt )}∞
t=1 in this case.
6. Related literature
In one of the ﬁrst attempts to understand the restrictions imposed by SEU, Pearce (1984)
showed that when the analyst knows the agent’s preferences over mixtures of actions
SEU rules out players choosing strictly dominated strategies. Ledyard (1986) and Börg
ers (1993) assume that only preferences over pure strategy outcomes are observable, and
show that, as in Pearce (1984), a notion of domination carries the testable content of SEU.
Blume and Easley (1998) and Nyarko (1997b) have shown that, given an observable proﬁle
of utility functions any stochastic process of undominated actions can be the outcome of
a model of intertemporal optimization and Bayesian learning. Nyarko (1997b) considers
the zero discount factor case while Blume and Easley (1998) consider the more general
case. From the methodological standpoint, Blume and Easley (1998) can be thought of as
a direct precursor of the present work.
Lo (2000) shows that if one is restricted to the observation of only one choice from
a ﬁnite set of acts, the subjective expected utility model is observationally indistinguish
able from all models of preference that satisfy Savage’s axiom P3, which is a form of
monotonicity. Epstein (2000) points to the need for the analyst to observe choices from at
least two different sets of choices where the agent has the same belief if one is to be able
to refute SEU. Border (1992) assumes that the analyst is able to observe the entire choice
function of the agent and shows that any choice function consistent with SEU must not be
stochastically dominated.
Another closely related paper is that of Green and Park (1996), which asks whether a
strategy can be rationalized by maximization of conditional state dependent utility. They
identify a necessary and sufﬁcient condition, in an environment with a correctly speciﬁed
prior, for a strategy to be rationalizable. Their condition requires for a plan not to react to
“irrelevant” information. It is a very weak condition.

7. Conclusions
The present paper contributes to the literature associated with how little restrictions the
assumptions of rationality impose on individual and collective behavior by showing that
when the analyst knows nothing about the preferences or beliefs of an agent any sequence
of actions observed by the analyst can be the outcome of some model of intertemporal
optimization and Bayesian learning.
Not all predictive content of SEU is lost in practice, however, because auxiliary assump
tions about what is known to the analyst can be made which, jointly with observability of
actions and SEU, generate testable implications. In this sense, the result presented in this

paper is an instance of a principle known to modern philosophers of science: that no core
set of theoretical assumptions can be contradicted in isolation (Caldwell, 1982, Chapter 4).
References
Blume, L., Easley, D., 1998. Rational expectations and rational learning. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Organizations
with Incomplete Information. Cambridge Univ. Press., Cambridge, pp. 61–109.
Border, K., 1992. Revealed preference, stochastic dominance, and the expected utility hypothesis. J. Econ. The
ory 56, 20–42.
Börgers, T., 1993. Pure strategy dominance. Econometrica 61, 423–430.
Caldwell, B., 1982. Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century. Allen & Unwin, Lon
don.
Epstein, L., 2000. Are probabilities used in markets? J. Econ. Theory 91, 86–90.
Green, E., Park, I., 1996. Bayes contingent plans. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 31, 225–236.
Jordan, J., 1997. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective. In: Bicchieri, C., Jeffrey, R., Skyrms, B.
(Eds.), The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, pp. 149–174.
Ledyard, J., 1986. The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium. J. Econ. Theory 39, 59–82.
Lo, K., 2000. Rationalizability and the Savage axioms. Econ. Theory 15, 727–733.
Nyarko, Y., 1997a. Savage–Bayesian agents play a repeated game. In: Bicchieri, C., Jeffrey, R., Skyrms, B. (Eds.),
The Dynamics of Norms. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, pp. 175–197.
Nyarko, Y., 1997b. Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs. J. Econ. Theory 74,
266–296.
Oakes, D., 1985. Self-calibrating priors do not exist. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 80, 339.
Pearce, D., 1984. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica 52, 1029–1050.

